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Introduction 
Since the its inception, Bitcoin has been known as an instrument incapable of transacting a 
great amount of transitions per unit of time. Bitcoin has written in its own code that every 
ten minutes a block can be mined and added to the blockchain1. These limitations lead for 
the major part of Bitcoin’s life to have as maximum number 7 transactions per second, to 
make comparison Visa process routinely 2000 transactions per second, with peaks of 
several dozens of thousands (1).  
 
Since miners are the one capable to build and add block to the blockchain this low 
throughput allowed them to impose higher fees in times of great demand. The most 
emblematic example occurred in 2017 when fees skyrocket from an average less than one 
dollar per transaction to several dozens. Fees depends on number of transactions waiting to 
be added in the blockchain, not on the amount of Bitcoins transacted per time, therefore the 
blockchain can be very cheap compared to traditional means in case of large payments, 
                                                          
1 Said node must be one megabyte or less.  
 
It is now a whole year since Lightning Network (LN) has been launched on the 
Bitcoin’s mainnet. LN has been claimed as the solution for several of Bitcoin’s 
weaknesses such as its difficulty to scale in number of transactions per second 
and its expensiveness for relative small amount exchanged. LN is based upon a 
network of micro-channels opened and closed by issuing transactions on the 
Blockchain and capable to interact among themselves thanks to the Multi-hop 
framework. In this work I analysed the evolution of LN from its topological point 
of view and tried to understand how it impacts over some of Bitcoin’s historical 
core foundamentals such as the resilience against attacks and failures and the 
user’s anonymity. Another question I have tried to answer is whether the 
evolution of LN’s topology will make its synchronization easier.  
potentially moving hundreds of millions for few cents, but it is extremely inefficient for 
routinely payments and for micropayments. 
  
Several attempts have been tried in order to increase throughputs and lower latencies, for 
instance in November 2017 a hardfork2 occurred in the Bitcoin’s blockchain with the 
implementation of Segregated Witness (SegWit) through Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 
1413 (Bip 141) that quadruplicated the number of transactions that is possible to aggregate 
into a block. Another example occurred in August 2017 with the hard fork that in created 
Bitcoin Cash, a version of Bitcoin with blocks of 8Mb. Lightning Network is a system of 
Micropayments channels built on top of Bitcoin’s blockchain and therefore referred to as a 
solution of “layer 2” based on smart contracts. Two nodes can open a channel by issuing a 
multi signed transaction on the blockchain and thereafter being able to exchange a 
predefined amount of bitcoins back and forth freely. When the need for payments is 
fulfilled, another multi-signed transaction can be issued to the blockchain with the final 
balance. Lightning Network was proposed on February 2015 and in January 2018 the 
mainnet was launched, after a period of testing on a copy of the original Bitcoin’s blockhain 
called “testned”. The Lightning Network is the most recognized solution for scalability. It 
is based on off chains transactions, meaning that exchanges on the Lightning Network have 
not to be uploaded to the blockchain at every iteration.  
 
To open a channel a preliminary transaction between to parties is  issued on the blockchain, 
called “channel funding”. After that initial, in a sense ordinary, transaction everytime two 
parties wants to exchange funds on the channel they must issue new “commitment 
transactions” that are simply the balance of the channel signed by the two parties that has 
not to be broadcasted to the entire network, with the only exception of the last commitment 
which is also called “closing transaction” since it closes the channel and set the new balance 
on the blockchain. If a channel is excessively unbalanced towards one party than said 
channel is considered “unbalanced”, that can constitute a problem for other nodes that are 
perhaps interested in using that channel to route their transaction through the multi-hop 
framework. Another important feature of the Lightning Network is the possibility to make 
payments to nodes not directly connected through a channel via the “multi hop” algorithm 
that routes payments via nodes eventually reaching the desired one, if possible. Through 
Hashed Time Lock Contracts (HTLCs) it is possible to send payments to another node 
without  issuing a brand new channel with the condition to find a common path and enough 
available capacity in each and every channel of it.  
 
During its development one of the most concerning potential issue of Lightning was the 
possibility of a centralization of the Network. The problem resides in the nature of the multi 
hop framework. For instance, if node “Bob” wants to send 1 BTC to node “Alice” on the 
Lightning network, without opening a direct channel, it must search for a node that is 
connected to both with enough capacity to send its 1 Bitcoin to Alice in exchange of the 
Bitcoin from Bob, plus a fee. This of course would make nodes with higher capacity more 
likely to act like a payment hub, de facto centralizing the system. Centralization of 
Lightning Network would create concerns about users’ privacy since hubs would be able 
                                                          
2 A hardfork is when two parties do not agree on a proposed change in the protocol and they decide 
thereafter to proceed by themselves on two separate blockchains, one with the change implemented 
and the other one without.  
3 Bitcoin Improvement Proposal are the standard way for proposing to the community possible 
enhancements in the Bitcoin protocol.  
to collect information about a huge number of nodes, also hubs could be able to censor 
transactions or increase their fees (2), (3) and (4).  
 
In the second chapter, I am going to display the dataset used to perform the analysis and 
some preliminary information about how I decided to construct the network. In the third 
part of this article, I will present some topological information and their evolution through 
a period of 12 months. The fourth section is dedicated to analyse LN in the light of three 
different but extremely importance aspects, its robustness to failures and malicious attacks, 
its topological capability to help in the preservation of anonymity and finally if its topology 
is effective in promoting an environment where synchronization can be achieved.                                                                                     
Dataset and the Network 
Retrieving data for analysing the Lightning Network can be quite challenging. Transactions 
used to open and close channels  have been developed to be virtually indistinguishable  
from other smart contracts issued on the blockchain. The reason is that Miners, which are 
rewarded both with newly minted Bitcoin and with transaction fees, have the interest to 
keep the flow of transactions on the blockchain and they could prevent channels from 
opening by simply never including those transactions, if they were able to recognize them.  
In order to be able to obtain data from the lightning network we should open a channel with 
some highly connected node. Another way is to retrieve the information directly from pages 
that make their knowledge about the network available. We opted for this second option, 
in particular we used data from hashxp.org and engine for search and analysis in the 
lightning network.  
 
It is important to note that it is impossible to know if the data in our possession is the totality 
of the network or if there are some other nodes not directly or thorough Multi-Hop 
connected to the ones in 1ml.com possession. Using R’s packages Rvest and Jsonlite we 
retrieve data spawning from 12 of January 2018, launch of LN on the mainnet, to 12 of 
January 2019. Exchange rates between Bitcoin and USD and average transaction fees on 
the blockchain are taken from bitinfocharts.com. 
 
The final dataset has been composed by twelve different snapshots corresponding to the 
twelve of each month since February 2018 Fig. [1.a] until January 2019 Fig. [1.b]. The 
Biggest connected components for each month accounted for the entirely of the network, 
with only few disconnected components composed just by single couplets4.  
 
                                                          
4 We must consider that there are components that are not known by us, but it is logical to assume 
that their number and sizes are absolutely dwarfed by our component, which was built on the base 
of information collected from one of the most important LN’s operator. 
         
 Figure 1.a LN 02/12/2018                                                     Figure 1.b LN 01/12/2019 
In June 2018 Tony Arcery showed on twitter how the probability of successfully routing a 
transaction through the Lightning Network is 100% or so just for amounts below 0.001 
BTC, after that threshold said chances decrease dramatically reaching zero at less than 0.1 
BTC.  
This is of course linked to the median capacity actually installed among LN’s channels, 
this suspicion has its origin on the fact that Mr. Arcery performed the experiment in 
February and again in June and the two results followed quite truthfully the trend in the 
distribution of the number of nodes per capacity installed (5). For this reason I decided to 
perform most of the analysis using a weighted undirected network, undirected because 
there is no way to know one by one the distribution of funds on channels, therefore we 
assume for simplicity they are always balanced.  
As weights, we used the reciprocal of the installed capacity expressed in USD, in order to 
mitigate for the extreme volatility of Bitcoin’s price during all 2018.  
Topological evolution of Lightning Network 
In this chapter, I am going to provide with some preliminary descriptions of how LN has 
evolved during this year. The number of node connected at the time of each moment grew 
from 518 to 3613 and the number of channels from 1910 to 23860, therefore the Network 
evolved from an already remarkable sparsity even more so. Since its establishment LN has 
assumed the scale-free configuration, with the exponential ranging around 2, which is 
confirmed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test run for every take, as in table 1.  
 
 
Alpha KS_test p_val 
feb-18 1.9415 0.0472 0.7693 
mar-18 2.0474 0.0203 0.9996 
apr-18 2.1397 0.0344 0.8098 
mag-18 2.1048 0.0273 0.8310 
giu-18 2.1139 0.0239 0.9391 
lug-18 2.0443 0.0311 0.5763 
Table 1: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results 
ago-18 2.0705 0.0352 0.5361 
set-18 2.0917 0.0374 0.6040 
ott-18 2.1684 0.0313 0.8854 
nov-18 2.1341 0.0394 0.5890 
dic-18 2.0764 0.0358 0.5476 
gen-19 2.0694 0.0398 0.2628 
 
The median degree, a measure quite important if we consider both the necessity to routing 
transactions but also the vocation of Bitcoin to not be decentralised and for this reason more 
meaningful than the average degree, increased doubling from a median of 2 to 4 
connections per node.  
Since I decided to consider LN as weighted, it essential also to look for the median strength 
of nodes and its evolution. The strength of a node is the sum of all its edges weights, taking 
into consideration the fact that weights are normally considered as costs to pass through an 
edge, and our are the opposite, a lower strength means an higher capability of that node to 
accept flows of transactions through its channels.   
The Network present a visibly diassortativity, nodes with lower degree are easier to open 
channels with others with higher connectivity, this could be a signal of the formation of 
hubs in the network. This sort of behaviour is reasonable, since opening channels is costly 
the multi-hop routing system, thorough an highly connected node, can be a way cheaper 
solution in order to reach  a large number of other vertexes. 
If, instead of degree assortativity, I compute the assortativity for the weighted graph, as 
proposed by Leung and Chau (6), than we can see how the diassortative tendency of the 
Network disappears. This behaviour can be explained if we compute the correlation 
between nodes’ degree and their average capacity per channel. Surprisingly we can notice 
how being highly connected is not strongly correlated with the average capacity. 
This phenomenon might be explained by the fact that “poor” nodes prefer to connect 
directly to hubs in order to save transaction fees to open and close channels and routing 
fees, while more “wealthy” nodes have not this concern and connect directly to every node 
they are interested skipping hubs.   
This could pose a threat and a drawback from Bitcoin’s core values, though. An highly 
connected node can be used to harvest a great amount of information coming from the flow 
it is able to intercept, it can also censor transactions from or to a certain node, even if the 
sender change the routing plan, since there is an high probability that the malicious hub is 
connected to another of the passing nodes.  
Even if the hub is legit, its presence could constitute a liability to the LN since it poses as 
a preferential target to attacks deemed to destabilize the network, and for a considerable 
amount of time since if not indefinitely depending on the surface of aggression exploited5, 
this matter is going to be discussed deeper in the next section.  
                                                          
5 In March, BitPico sent down the 20% of nodes with a DDoS attack, another strategy would be to 
steal the private keys and close pivotal channels. In that case, and in the best scenario, it would be 
necessary to wait at least for ten minutes before starting recreating the initial set of connections. 
Finally I studied how the efficiency of the network, i.e. its ability to transfer information 
through its nodes with the fewer number of hops necessary, in other words the ratio between 
the efficiency of a network where every node is linked to another and the sum of the 
reciprocals of all shortest paths among nodes.  
Efficiency can be computed only taking into consideration nodes and their links or also the 
weighted Network, and we see how the unweighted version shows no improvement 
whatsoever while the weighted one improved sensibly month after month6. This is very 
likely due to the fact the capacity installed increased continuously during this period. 
 
 
Nodes Channels Median 
degree 
Median 
Strenght 
Total cap in 
BTC 
Total cap in USD 
feb-18 518 1910 2 1.08 6.24 54,072 
mar-18 733 2060 2 1.72 4.70 44,401 
apr-18 1359 6029 3 3.93 14.96 110,003 
mag-
18 
1721 8172 3 2.55 20.80 175,503 
giu-18 1808 7876 3 3.19 23.24 157,455 
lug-18 2039 8996 3 3.06 62.07 388,082 
ago-18 2130 11137 3 3.17 95.19 601,241 
set-18 2337 12312 3 1.61 115.47 725,934 
ott-18 2466 12429 3 1.59 113.58 713,085 
nov-18 2626 12958 3 1.03 114.16 733,584 
dic-18 2878 17086 3 1.34 469.63 1,635,724 
gen-19 3613 23860 4 0.86 581.42 2,121,019  
Assortivity 
(weig.) 
Assortivity 
(unweig.) 
Efficiency Transitivity Min. Spaw. 
Tree 
Density 
feb-18 -0.051 -0.370 8.94 0.12 0.269 1.4% 
mar-18 -0.110 -0.369 4.76 0.05 0.351 0.8% 
apr-18 -0.143 -0.267 5.99 0.09 0.222 0.7% 
mag-
18 
-0.129 -0.293 7.75 0.09 0.209 0.6% 
giu-18 -0.140 -0.284 6.38 0.07 0.227 0.5% 
lug-18 -0.107 -0.263 10.35 0.07 0.225 0.4% 
ago-18 -0.014 -0.249 17.37 0.09 0.190 0.5% 
set-18 -0.025 -0.258 24.93 0.09 0.188 0.5% 
ott-18 -0.035 -0.252 23.21 0.09 0.197 0.4% 
nov-18 -0.080 -0.269 22.79 0.08 0.201 0.4% 
dic-18 -0.022 -0.240 42.65 0.10 0.167 0.4% 
gen-19 -0.006 -0.220 42.18 0.10 0.150 0.4% 
 
LN Robustness, Anonymity and Synchronizability  
Because of the presence of channels with different capacities stored on them, LN can be 
seen in the same way as an infrastructure for transporting energy. Taking into consideration 
only the unweighted topology of the Network would possibly lead to erroneous conclusions 
about its robustness and capability to withstand an aggression. This has been showed in a 
recent paper by Bellingeri and Cassi, the framework of which is going to be my own (7).  
                                                          
6 Be aware that we should not compare weighted version of a measure against the unweighted one 
but only appreciate their own evolution in time. 
Table 2: A collection of topological measures about LN 
In their study they used the size of the largest connected component to assess the 
unweighted entity of the damage suffered after a failure and the Delta Weighted Efficiency 
Loss to assess the weighted size. They performed these measures taking into consideration 
several attacking strategies and the random event, which may occur in case of a non 
mischievous faultiness.  
For my research I am going to implement as first attacking strategies removing high degree 
node first, the second using the between centrality and their weighted counterparties. I 
could consider the number of nodes attacked as a function of the LN’s size or letting it 
constant considering the resources of an attacker do not depend on LN’s size, I opted for 
the latter solution and performed the attacks. 
All typologies of attacks happen both on an unweighted graph and with weights, removing 
1, 2, 5, 10, 25 and 50 nodes each time. Random failures’ number is surely linked with the 
size but, for sake of comparability with actual attacks, I opted for the same constants.  
The most effective strategies were based on between centralities, with the weighted being 
slightly better. We can see in table 3 how, after a sudden raise between February and March, 
the damage suffered by the network constantly decrease. Overall, the LN seems to be very 
resistant to random faultiness with drops in efficiency above 10% just in few occasions.  
 
Nodes 
removed  
feb-18 mar-18 apr-18 mag-18 giu-18 lug-18 
1 -8% -38% -19% -29% -17% -14% 
2 -12% -41% -41% -33% -29% -26% 
5 -23% -51% -56% -45% -48% -34% 
10 -34% -67% -74% -59% -54% -47% 
25 -50% -90% -87% -82% -74% -66% 
50 -66% -96% -96% -91% -85% -81% 
 
ago-18 set-18 ott-18 nov-18 dic-18 gen-19 
1 -10% -31% -22% -16% -13% -6% 
2 -24% -36% -39% -19% -29% -9% 
5 -35% -45% -53% -44% -42% -19% 
10 -49% -57% -62% -54% -49% -29% 
25 -58% -69% -75% -69% -66% -52% 
50 -79% -82% -85% -80% -79% -68% 
 
 
Nodes 
removed 
feb-18 mar-18 apr-18 mag-18 giu-18 lug-18 
1 -5% 0% 0% -6% -9% -4% 
2 -5% -1% 0% -6% -9% -4% 
5 -5% -2% 0% -6% -9% -4% 
10 -5% 0% -3% -6% -9% -5% 
25 -5% -7% -2% -7% -11% -6% 
50 -6% -1% -10% -7% -11% -12% 
 
ago-18 set-18 ott-18 nov-18 dic-18 gen-19 
Table4: Efficiency drops in weighted random failures 
Table 3: Efficiency drops in weighted Bet. Centrality attacks 
1 -3% -5% -5% -5% -4% -3% 
2 -4% -5% -5% -5% -5% -3% 
5 -3% -5% -5% -5% -4% -3% 
10 -7% -6% -6% -5% -4% -3% 
25 -6% -8% -7% -6% -5% -3% 
50 -9% -5% -6% -18% -5% -3% 
  
As I mantioned earlier, following the work of Bellingeri and Cassi, I used also the 
percentage of the largest connected component that converged into the new one after the 
attacks/failures. Also in this case the most efficient way to maliciously meddling with LN 
is through attacks based on weighted between centrality.  
This second measure confirms what have been previously noted, the evolution of LN is 
making it somewhat stronger against highly directed attacks and it prooves to be very robust 
in case of random non hostile failures. Is interesting to notice how a single malicious 
remotion of a node do not compromise the unweighted topology of the network but 
provokes a slightly reduction in its efficiency, this should be interpret as a clear signal of 
few redundancies with sufficient capacity to provide one with another.  
This has some major implication not only for attacks and failures but also for normal 
routine such as the deliberate closure of a channel by its owner, which may result in having 
the same effect of a non-wanted event. This will be adreessed in this chapter taling about 
synchronization and coordination among nodes. 
 
 
Nodes 
removed 
feb-18 mar-18 apr-18 mag-18 giu-18 lug-18 
1 100% 86% 92% 96% 100% 99% 
2 98% 85% 82% 96% 96% 96% 
5 98% 84% 78% 94% 91% 95% 
10 94% 73% 70% 87% 90% 90% 
25 89% 58% 58% 72% 82% 85% 
50 82% 32% 35% 62% 70% 71%  
ago-18 set-18 ott-18 nov-18 dic-18 gen-19 
1 99% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2 95% 99% 99% 100% 98% 100% 
5 94% 95% 95% 96% 96% 96% 
10 89% 93% 91% 94% 91% 93% 
25 85% 86% 84% 85% 85% 87% 
50 74% 75% 73% 73% 76% 78% 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Percentage of the original LCC remained after 
weighted Bet. Centrality attacks 
 Nodes 
removed 
feb-18 mar-18 apr-18 mag-18 giu-18 lug-18 
1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
5 100% 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 
10 100% 98% 98% 99% 99% 98% 
25 99% 94% 96% 98% 98% 98% 
50 98% 90% 92% 96% 97% 96%  
ago-18 set-18 ott-18 nov-18 dic-18 gen-19 
1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
5 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10 99% 99% 99% 100% 100% 100% 
25 99% 98% 99% 99% 99% 99% 
50 97% 98% 96% 96% 98% 98% 
 
Bitcoin has always been linked with anonymity, before becoming a highly speculative asset 
it achieved fame mostly due to its use in the dark market. Some attempts to de-anonymize 
components of a network can rely upon its topological characteristics and weakness. 
In preserving the privacy on nodes a role is played also by the Network’s configuration 
itself, for example edge k-anonymity is a technique that sever connections and creates new 
one in order to arrange groups of nodes indistinguishable with respect to at least k-1 other 
peers. Singh and Zhan proposed a metric to assess the level of anonymity provided by the 
graph itself called “topological anonymity” (ta) which is a composite indicator derived 
from degrees and clustering coefficients (8). 
𝑡𝑎 =
∑ (|𝐷𝑖| ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖) − ∑ |𝐷𝑗|
 ϵ−1
𝑗=1
max (deg(𝐺))
𝑖=1
𝑛
 
with |Di| the number of nodes with degree D and CC the Boolean cluster coefficient, which 
is 1 if var(CC(D))>0 and zero otherwise. In their paper, they assessed ta of different 
networks and with different levels of security required, expressed with the parameter ϵ from 
2 to 4.  
 
 
 
 
Taking again into consideration that privacy is perhaps the raison d'etre of Bitcoin, I 
decided to set the level on 4, the maximum. From my analysis, we can see how LN is 
actually improving its overall topological resistance to anonymity breaches of nodes and 
edges. 
Bitcoin is a decentralized system where consensus and coordination are forced using the 
“Proof of Work” algorithm, on Lightning Network there is not such system and the 
02/2018 03/2018 04/2018 05/2018 06/2018 07/2018 
0.34 0.24 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.43 
08/2018 09/2018 10/2018 11/2018 12/2018 01/2019 
0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.49 
Table 7: Lightning Network’s ta evolution 
Table 6 :Percentage of the original LCC remained random failures 
behaviour of its components is left to their own ability, if any, to coordinate among 
themselves.  
Coordination in LN is particularly important for those nodes that we have seen playing 
critical roles in the network. Eventually those nodes will have to close channels in order to 
upload the new balance on the blockchain, for any kind of reason one of which might be 
the channel is too unbalanced. If some channels were closed, the best scenario would 
consist of a network fully capable to offsets for all the time necessary until the connection 
is established again.  
Synchronizability is a critical feature in Networks for them to be able to coordinate 
themselves and Pecora and Carroll proved that one of the key factor lies within the 
Laplacian Matrix’s eigenvalues, in particular in the ration between the second and the 
smallest non zero ones, known as the eigenratio.  
In particular the lower is the value of the eigenratio the more the network is synchronizable 
and viceversa (9). My results shows that after a sudden increase in the eigenratio between 
mid-February and mid-march, similar to what we seen with the robustness analysis, its 
value continued to growth but at a slower pace, indicating a degradation in LN’s 
synchronizability which can lead to disservices during some pivotal channel’s closing-
reopening.  
In fact, we could represent the entire LN as an ensemble of multi-state oscillators, the 
channels, with three different possible states: “Open & Balanced”; “Open & Unbalanced” 
and “Closed”. A channel could arrive in the closed and open & balanced states from both 
the other two, while the unbalanced state can be reached only from the balanced one.  
Since it is impossible to know the distribution of funds in all channels without reaching 
them directly through the multi-hop, a more syncronizable topology would help in reducing 
the difficulty to collect this kind of information and moving from a state to another 
accordingly both with the node’s own necessities as well with the Network’s ones. 
 
feb-18 mar-18 apr-18 mag-18 giu-18 lug-18 
7.82 24.00 24.18 25.71 24.81 25.83 
ago-18 set-18 ott-18 nov-18 dic-18 gen-19 
25.45 25.54 25.57 25.78 29.92 29.94 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper I presented you the topological analysis of Bitcoin’s Lightning Network 
performed through all its first year of existence on the mainnet.  
During this period this period the number of nodes increased by almost 7 times and the 
number of channels simultaneously available by more than 12 times. The value loaded on 
channels is still negligible if compared with Bitcoin’s $60 billion market cap as of the time 
I am writing, but is growing rapidly both in total value as well as in average per channel.  
Table 8: Lightning Network’s Eigenratio evolution 
I showed also how the fear that LN would have brought with itself centralization was not 
without basis, since it now clearly presents a structure of high degree hubs to whom low 
degree nodes prefer to attach in order to be able to reach more other peers without having 
to establish direct connection with them.  
I show that this process do not affect richer nodes  that prefer to bypass hubs connecting 
directly with whoever they want, we can imagine this situation as a contraposition of malls 
for average people against boutiques for the wealthier.  
I have also investigated LN from three point of view, for the best of my knowledge, quite 
critical for it success, which are its robustness, its ability to preserve privacy and to enhance 
coordination between its nodes.  
We have seen how the network autonomously is improving its resistance both to random 
non malicious failures as well as against attacks and how the evolution of its topology is 
improving, from a topological point of view at least, the preservation of the users’ privacy.  
Finally, the part that seen LN growth somehow wanting was its ability to create the 
condition for reaching coordination, which is constantly dropping. This dynamic could 
pose a serious threat for a wider adoption of this solution, since the correct functioning of 
the entire network relies on the shoulders of few nodes and their channels.  
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